Putin's "War Threat" to NATO Is a Giant Bluff
The threats are bunk. Putin’s “ready for war with Europe” line is bluff and leverage, a bargaining position not a battle plan. NATO’s real risk is not an invasion: it's taking Putin seriously.
Don’t miss our Deep Dive on the Russia-Ukraine talks, and how Trump aims to win.
by Andrew Latham
December 5, 2025
Putin’s assertion that Russia is “ready for war with Europe,” tossed out on the eve of the latest round of Ukraine peace talks, has predictably rattled Western capitals.
Commentators hastened to present it as part of the start of a broader confrontation, a strategic drumroll before a coming clash between Moscow and NATO. But such a reading misjudges the situation and the man. Putin is not gearing up to charge the West: he is gearing up for the bargaining table.
This big-man posturing is classic, designed for maximum negotiating leverage at a moment when diplomatic talks are delicately poised, and both sides are trying to shape the narrative of who is on top and who has the upper hand. It is an act of intimidation, not a declaration of intention.
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A Rhetoric of Strength — Precisely Because Russia Is Tired
Putin’s threat sounds like strength because it attempts to mask exhaustion. Russia is a diminished power that is carrying on in many ways out of necessity. After nearly four years of grinding conflict, its economy has adapted, but barely.
Its military has adapted, but at significant cost. Its society has adapted, but only because dissent has been effectively criminalized out of existence.
The message that Russia is “ready for war with Europe” plays a very different role than actual preparation for a continent-wide war.
It is meant to change the Russian public and global narratives around this war, reframing Russia from a great power reluctantly pulled into conflict by battlefield pressure and domestic constraints into a great power acting voluntarily and by choice.
This is what states resort to when they need to negotiate from a position of weakness that they cannot actually sustain.
Put bluntly, if Russia wanted a war with NATO, it would not be telegraphing it. It would be building quietly, systematically, and with strategic surprise toward it—none of which is visible today.
A Strategic Bluff, Not a Mobilization
Russia has upped the ante on nuclear signaling and is now redoubling its joint drills with Belarus.
But this is not the kind of mobilization that would be expected before an actual attack on NATO. Moscow has not raised the nuclear alert to crisis level. It has not done the kinds of overt signaling one might expect before an imminent attack. Nor, critically, has it redeployed the massed troop formations or reorganized the logistics networks needed to sustain a campaign on this scale.
Instead, Moscow is continuing to prioritize the Ukraine front over expansion. What we are seeing is the choreography of coercive diplomacy. Putin wants to convey at the peace table that NATO should tread carefully. He wants Europeans to question their long-term support for Ukraine. He wants Washington to recalibrate the size and shape of future assistance. And he wants to signal to global audiences that Russia still claims a veto over the geopolitical fate of its near abroad.
Restraint, Not Panic, Is the Proper Lens
A restraint-centered lens is needed precisely because it guards against the two impulses that so often distort Western analysis: alarmism and triumphalism. Alarmism views every Russian word as a threat of aggression, while triumphalism sees every Russian setback as proof that Moscow is about to collapse.
Both are wrong about escalation dynamics, and both misread the limits of power.
Restraint begins with clarity. Russia is dangerous, but dangerous is not the same as threatening. Russia is unpredictable, but strategic unpredictability is not the same as strategic insanity. Russia wants influence, not annihilation. Russia wants a negotiated end to the war on terms that validate its sacrifices, not an open-ended, possibly escalatory confrontation with a nuclear alliance that dwarfs it militarily, economically, and technologically.
Taking Putin’s rhetoric at face value would be to turn posturing into prophecy. Panic is a form of strategic self-harm.
The Negotiation Backdrop Matters
Putin’s timing makes his motive even clearer. He issued his warning just as multiple formal, informal, and third-party diplomatic channels are converging to seek out a possible political settlement to the Ukraine war. Russia will enter these talks with a position of leverage, but also a position of limits. It controls territory but cannot easily advance.
It has survived sanctions for now, but the cumulative economic pressure has been corrosive. It has sustained the war politically, but only by repressing dissent rather than rallying national enthusiasm.
In that context, Putin’s “ready for war” remarks operate as hedging. They suggest that Russia can walk away from a deal it finds unfavorable and help project an image of implacability that conceals very real vulnerabilities. They remind all parties that while Russia wants a negotiated off-ramp, it does not want to be seen as the weaker stakeholder that is seeking a way out. This is the theater of diplomacy, not the drumbeat of war.
NATO Should Avoid the Trap
The danger comes not from Russia, but from how NATO might react to it.
If NATO interprets this moment as actual preparation for escalation, it might then over-mobilize, over-signal, or over-promise. Such steps would trap NATO into commitments that do not align with its strategic interests. Europe has defense priorities, but they do not require Moscow to prepare for its survival.
The smart course is to reinforce existing deterrence efforts, continue supporting Ukraine within bounds, and keep open channels to whatever political settlement is eventually feasible. Restraint is not a sign of weakness; it is an understanding of limits — our own as well as Russia’s — informed prudence.
Putin’s Words Are a Mirror, Not a Window
What Putin said is less a window into what Russia intends to do than a mirror of what it fears: strategic isolation, military exhaustion, and a negotiated settlement that falls short of the objectives that justified this war.
Putin and the Russian leadership’s rhetoric that Russia is “ready for war with Europe” is meant to hide these anxieties, not express new ambitions.
The distinction matters. Misreading big-man posturing for big-man intent is how great powers stumble into conflicts none of them want. This moment requires sobriety, not theatrics, and a political imagination disciplined by restraint rather than runaway speculation.
Putin is not preparing to go to war with NATO. He is preparing for peace talks — and trying to ensure they take place on terms advantageous to him.
Reading him through that lens is the only way to keep diplomacy anchored in reality rather than fear.
— Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. This essay originally appeared in National Security Journal.
The game of thrones to destroy russia needs to stop. Russia needs to be integrated into the worlds economy. The "iron" bank is still the prime issue. Destruction of the bank is the prime directive.
ok so, here’s the thing, and sorry but this needs a long comment because the whole “Putin is just bluffing, NATO is overreacting” line is… kinda built on not reading the actual Russian doctrinal texts.
you don’t even need secret intel, just basic homework.
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First: Gerasimov literally tells you this is war already
In 2013 Valery Gerasimov writes “The Value of Science in Foresight” (Ценность науки в предвидении).
English discussion + refs here:
• https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/how-russia-does-foresight 
• English translation used in a lot of papers, e.g. Small Wars Journal: http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf 
He literally says that:
“the lines between war and peace are becoming blurred…
non-military means may in many cases exceed the power of weapons in their effectiveness”
This is their framing, not mine. No clear “peace vs war” binary. It’s a continuous conflict space.
So when you look at Putin’s “threats” to NATO and say “oh that’s just theater for the bargaining table”, you are imposing a Western IR 101 frame onto a doctrine that explicitly denies that frame. In this logic, information pressure, nuclear signalling, destabilisation, sabotage, all of it = legitimate tools of ongoing warfare.
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Second: the 2014 Military Doctrine literally spells out integrated non-military warfare
Go read the 2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (official translation, e.g.):
• PDF mirror: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mildoc_rf_2014_eng.pdf 
• Or text mirror: https://michaelbommarito.com/wiki/nato/documents/russian-military-doctrine-2014/ 
Characteristic features of modern conflict there include (paraphrasing the English version):
integrated use of military force and political, economic, informational and other non-military measures,
with widespread use of the protest potential of the population and special operations
That’s not my “conspiracy take”, that’s the doctrine.
So yeah, let’s translate that into normal language:
• information ops
• pressure and influence on officials
• money, kompromat, blackmail, “friendly intermediaries”
• activation / manipulation of protest movements
• special ops abroad (sabotage, covert action, etc.)
In other words: what we in the West would separately call corruption, disinformation, covert action, “foreign interference”, targeted intimidation of elites – in their military doctrine is part of the toolbox of war.
So when Western commentary treats all this as “just politics” and “not real war”, it’s basically disagreeing with the official Russian description of their own methods.
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Third: nuclear deterrence doctrine = threat as a planned instrument, not “empty talk”
2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”:
• English text: https://www.russiamatters.org/2020-basic-principles-state-policy-russian-federation-nuclear-deterrence 
• Or direct ENG PDF: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/nucdet_rf_2020_eng.pdf 
Look at how they define deterrence:
“a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design…” 
and:
“Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and in wartime.” 
In plain English:
• threats, “reminders”, public statements about nukes are not random emotional outbursts;
• they are a deliberate channel of pressure designed into the state policy.
So the whole line “if they really wanted war they wouldn’t telegraph it” just doesn’t hold. Telegraphed nuclear risk is the method. It’s meant to shape Western decision-making, slow weapons deliveries, split alliances, etc.
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Fourth: “non-military measures” absolutely include targeting individuals
If you put Gerasimov’s text, the 2014 doctrine and the 2020 nuclear document next to each other and then compare with practice, the pattern is pretty obvious:
• full-spectrum conflict, no strict peace/war boundary 
• integrated use of informational, economic, political, and special-ops tools 
• constant nuclear deterrence + signalling to shape behaviour of adversary states 
Now add the open record of what Western inquiries say about Russian behavior:
• UK Litvinenko Inquiry: strong evidence that Russian state organs were behind his killing.
Report: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a8055c340f0b62302692e48/The-Litvinenko-Inquiry-H-C-695-web.pdf 
• 2018 Skripal / Novichok case: a UK public inquiry in 2025 concludes the operation was run by GRU, and that Putin bears responsibility / ordered it.
Short summary via Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/main-findings-uk-report-into-2018-novichok-incident-2025-12-04/ 
Context + “morally responsible” finding: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-04/uk-inquiry-findings-woman-2018-novichok-poisoning/106103644 
These are not vague blogs, this is official UK process saying:
state structures + highest leadership → responsible for targeted poisoning operations abroad.
Now compare that to “use of special operations, protest potential, non-military measures” in Russian doctrine. It fits like a glove. In practice this can include:
• intimidation and/or elimination of high-value opponents abroad;
• pressure and influence campaigns aimed at decision-makers;
• use of criminal/opaque financial networks for leverage (see work on “Crimintern” etc.). 
So when you talk about “corruption of top officials, assassinations, attempts” etc., you don’t even need to speculate wildly. You just need to:
1. read the doctrine (what tools are allowed),
2. look at documented practice (what tools are used),
3. understand this is not some side show — it is the war by their own definition.
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Fifth: “the war is not on US territory” – ehh, that depends what you call war
If we accept Russian doctrinal framing (blurred peace/war, integrated non-military conflict), then US homeland is already part of the battlespace:
• cyber ops against infrastructure and government networks,
• info ops targeting elections, wedge issues, social conflict lines,
• influence campaigns via proxies, media outlets, botnets,
• attempts to access, compromise or pressure people in politics, business, tech, diaspora.
Western strategy papers literally describe this as “non-linear warfare”, “hybrid clash with NATO”, “active measures” etc. 
From Moscow’s perspective this is normal war below the threshold:
“strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle… including targets in its homeland.” 
So no, you don’t have tank columns rolling through New Jersey. But you absolutely have operations aimed at:
• your political decision-making,
• your social cohesion,
• your infrastructure and information space.
In the Gerasimov / 2014 doctrine paradigm, that’s not “peacetime”. That is the war.
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Sixth: why the “just a bluff” take is dangerously shallow
The article you’re defending basically says (simplifying):
• Putin’s threat to NATO = bluff for negotiations;
• real danger = NATO overreacting to a bluff;
• Russia wants influence, not a big war.
Thing is:
1. Russian doctrine says:
• war is continuous,
• non-military + covert tools are core, not decorative,
• signalling & intimidation are structured into state policy. 
2. Russian practice shows:
• state-run or state-linked killings/poisonings abroad (Litvinenko, Skripal etc., per UK findings) 
• persistent hybrid / cyber / info ops against NATO states. 
3. Western official docs (NATO, CNA, etc.) describe Russian strategy as aiming to degrade an adversary’s will and ability, including in its homeland, before and below open conflict. 
Putting this together and then calling current threats “just a giant bluff” is not realism, it’s selective reading.
It downplays:
• the doctrinal decision to treat all domains as a single theatre of war,
• the integration of corruption / intimidation / assassinations / influence into the toolkit,
• the fact that US and European territory are already active targets in that toolkit.
You don’t have to scream “full-scale NATO–Russia war tomorrow” to acknowledge that this is not mere theatre. But you do have to, at minimum, read the playbook the other side actually published.
Right now the “giant bluff” narrative feels less like analysis and more like a comforting story for Western audiences who don’t want to admit that the war is already here – just not in the shape they were taught to recognize in Cold War textbooks.