The threats are bunk. Putin’s “ready for war with Europe” line is bluff and leverage, a bargaining position not a battle plan. NATO’s real risk is not an invasion: it's taking Putin seriously.
ok so, here’s the thing, and sorry but this needs a long comment because the whole “Putin is just bluffing, NATO is overreacting” line is… kinda built on not reading the actual Russian doctrinal texts.
you don’t even need secret intel, just basic homework.
⸻
First: Gerasimov literally tells you this is war already
In 2013 Valery Gerasimov writes “The Value of Science in Foresight” (Ценность науки в предвидении).
“the lines between war and peace are becoming blurred…
non-military means may in many cases exceed the power of weapons in their effectiveness”
This is their framing, not mine. No clear “peace vs war” binary. It’s a continuous conflict space.
So when you look at Putin’s “threats” to NATO and say “oh that’s just theater for the bargaining table”, you are imposing a Western IR 101 frame onto a doctrine that explicitly denies that frame. In this logic, information pressure, nuclear signalling, destabilisation, sabotage, all of it = legitimate tools of ongoing warfare.
⸻
Second: the 2014 Military Doctrine literally spells out integrated non-military warfare
Go read the 2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (official translation, e.g.):
• special ops abroad (sabotage, covert action, etc.)
In other words: what we in the West would separately call corruption, disinformation, covert action, “foreign interference”, targeted intimidation of elites – in their military doctrine is part of the toolbox of war.
So when Western commentary treats all this as “just politics” and “not real war”, it’s basically disagreeing with the official Russian description of their own methods.
⸻
Third: nuclear deterrence doctrine = threat as a planned instrument, not “empty talk”
2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”:
“a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design…” 
and:
“Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and in wartime.” 
In plain English:
• threats, “reminders”, public statements about nukes are not random emotional outbursts;
• they are a deliberate channel of pressure designed into the state policy.
So the whole line “if they really wanted war they wouldn’t telegraph it” just doesn’t hold. Telegraphed nuclear risk is the method. It’s meant to shape Western decision-making, slow weapons deliveries, split alliances, etc.
⸻
Fourth: “non-military measures” absolutely include targeting individuals
If you put Gerasimov’s text, the 2014 doctrine and the 2020 nuclear document next to each other and then compare with practice, the pattern is pretty obvious:
• full-spectrum conflict, no strict peace/war boundary 
• integrated use of informational, economic, political, and special-ops tools 
• constant nuclear deterrence + signalling to shape behaviour of adversary states 
Now add the open record of what Western inquiries say about Russian behavior:
• UK Litvinenko Inquiry: strong evidence that Russian state organs were behind his killing.
These are not vague blogs, this is official UK process saying:
state structures + highest leadership → responsible for targeted poisoning operations abroad.
Now compare that to “use of special operations, protest potential, non-military measures” in Russian doctrine. It fits like a glove. In practice this can include:
• intimidation and/or elimination of high-value opponents abroad;
• pressure and influence campaigns aimed at decision-makers;
• use of criminal/opaque financial networks for leverage (see work on “Crimintern” etc.). 
So when you talk about “corruption of top officials, assassinations, attempts” etc., you don’t even need to speculate wildly. You just need to:
1. read the doctrine (what tools are allowed),
2. look at documented practice (what tools are used),
3. understand this is not some side show — it is the war by their own definition.
⸻
Fifth: “the war is not on US territory” – ehh, that depends what you call war
If we accept Russian doctrinal framing (blurred peace/war, integrated non-military conflict), then US homeland is already part of the battlespace:
• cyber ops against infrastructure and government networks,
• info ops targeting elections, wedge issues, social conflict lines,
• influence campaigns via proxies, media outlets, botnets,
• attempts to access, compromise or pressure people in politics, business, tech, diaspora.
Western strategy papers literally describe this as “non-linear warfare”, “hybrid clash with NATO”, “active measures” etc. 
From Moscow’s perspective this is normal war below the threshold:
“strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle… including targets in its homeland.” 
So no, you don’t have tank columns rolling through New Jersey. But you absolutely have operations aimed at:
• your political decision-making,
• your social cohesion,
• your infrastructure and information space.
In the Gerasimov / 2014 doctrine paradigm, that’s not “peacetime”. That is the war.
⸻
Sixth: why the “just a bluff” take is dangerously shallow
The article you’re defending basically says (simplifying):
• Putin’s threat to NATO = bluff for negotiations;
• real danger = NATO overreacting to a bluff;
• Russia wants influence, not a big war.
Thing is:
1. Russian doctrine says:
• war is continuous,
• non-military + covert tools are core, not decorative,
• signalling & intimidation are structured into state policy. 
2. Russian practice shows:
• state-run or state-linked killings/poisonings abroad (Litvinenko, Skripal etc., per UK findings) 
• persistent hybrid / cyber / info ops against NATO states. 
3. Western official docs (NATO, CNA, etc.) describe Russian strategy as aiming to degrade an adversary’s will and ability, including in its homeland, before and below open conflict. 
Putting this together and then calling current threats “just a giant bluff” is not realism, it’s selective reading.
It downplays:
• the doctrinal decision to treat all domains as a single theatre of war,
• the integration of corruption / intimidation / assassinations / influence into the toolkit,
• the fact that US and European territory are already active targets in that toolkit.
You don’t have to scream “full-scale NATO–Russia war tomorrow” to acknowledge that this is not mere theatre. But you do have to, at minimum, read the playbook the other side actually published.
Right now the “giant bluff” narrative feels less like analysis and more like a comforting story for Western audiences who don’t want to admit that the war is already here – just not in the shape they were taught to recognize in Cold War textbooks.
All of that is fascinating. And I am certainly not one to needlessly "poke the bear".
But let's look at this another way.
1. Vladimir Putin may have ruined the illusion that the Russian military is First World, he may have managed to de-Finlandize Finland (a true "geopolitical catastrophe" from Russia's point of view), but he's not an idiot. He's a very good negotiator, as the Russians have always been generally. He's going to posture to the maximum extent he can, as he should from his point of view, and Donald Trump is a fool if he doesn't see that and take it into account.
But Donald Trump is not a fool.
2. Now as to that illusion. First, Russia can't get to Warsaw or Berlin if in four years it can't get to Kiev, and that's all we need to know about Russia's "superpower" status. It's far from all we do know, but it's more than Putin knew when he tried to take Kiev and didn't have enough fuel for his tank columns. The Russian state is a web of corruption and lies, and the war has revealed them.
So what does that leave? Nukes? Sure. "Russian doctrine" can literally be anything, but Putin likes surviving, and he needs his country to not be an ash heap. And that's exactly what he's going to be -- dead in an ash heap that used to be a country -- if he decides to nuke not one but three very capable nuclear powers (because NATO has three, you know). And if anyone is stupid enough to think China will stick its neck out to help Russia in that situation, I ask you to tell me how many ground troops China has in Ukraine right now.
Russia is an important country. Russia's interests should not be lightly dismissed in the way that Clinton, Obama, and Biden dismissed them. But I'm sorry, I'm not afraid of a "power" with an economy smaller than Texas. And neither is this Administration. If Russia were somehow magically impervious to nuclear retaliation, I might think differently. But Russia can't even defend its refineries from Zelensky. So there's a distinct limit to their "awesomeness", and while we'd like a peace that's good for everybody, we're not suckers. For that, you'd have needed Kamala.
The game of thrones to destroy russia needs to stop. Russia needs to be integrated into the worlds economy. The "iron" bank is still the prime issue. Destruction of the bank is the prime directive.
Trump is giving them exactly that off-ramp. Putin overpromised to his constituencies and that's making this harder than it needs to be, and also, Putin is Russian and therefore maximalist in his demands by nature. Even so, Trump has no illusions about any of that. There can be a peace that's good for absolutely everyone. But we're going to need to check a few face-saving boxes that allow Putin the chance to survive (literally), and I think we're already mostly there (see the Deep Dive linked at the top of this article).
ok so, here’s the thing, and sorry but this needs a long comment because the whole “Putin is just bluffing, NATO is overreacting” line is… kinda built on not reading the actual Russian doctrinal texts.
you don’t even need secret intel, just basic homework.
⸻
First: Gerasimov literally tells you this is war already
In 2013 Valery Gerasimov writes “The Value of Science in Foresight” (Ценность науки в предвидении).
English discussion + refs here:
• https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/how-russia-does-foresight 
• English translation used in a lot of papers, e.g. Small Wars Journal: http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf 
He literally says that:
“the lines between war and peace are becoming blurred…
non-military means may in many cases exceed the power of weapons in their effectiveness”
This is their framing, not mine. No clear “peace vs war” binary. It’s a continuous conflict space.
So when you look at Putin’s “threats” to NATO and say “oh that’s just theater for the bargaining table”, you are imposing a Western IR 101 frame onto a doctrine that explicitly denies that frame. In this logic, information pressure, nuclear signalling, destabilisation, sabotage, all of it = legitimate tools of ongoing warfare.
⸻
Second: the 2014 Military Doctrine literally spells out integrated non-military warfare
Go read the 2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (official translation, e.g.):
• PDF mirror: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mildoc_rf_2014_eng.pdf 
• Or text mirror: https://michaelbommarito.com/wiki/nato/documents/russian-military-doctrine-2014/ 
Characteristic features of modern conflict there include (paraphrasing the English version):
integrated use of military force and political, economic, informational and other non-military measures,
with widespread use of the protest potential of the population and special operations
That’s not my “conspiracy take”, that’s the doctrine.
So yeah, let’s translate that into normal language:
• information ops
• pressure and influence on officials
• money, kompromat, blackmail, “friendly intermediaries”
• activation / manipulation of protest movements
• special ops abroad (sabotage, covert action, etc.)
In other words: what we in the West would separately call corruption, disinformation, covert action, “foreign interference”, targeted intimidation of elites – in their military doctrine is part of the toolbox of war.
So when Western commentary treats all this as “just politics” and “not real war”, it’s basically disagreeing with the official Russian description of their own methods.
⸻
Third: nuclear deterrence doctrine = threat as a planned instrument, not “empty talk”
2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”:
• English text: https://www.russiamatters.org/2020-basic-principles-state-policy-russian-federation-nuclear-deterrence 
• Or direct ENG PDF: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/nucdet_rf_2020_eng.pdf 
Look at how they define deterrence:
“a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design…” 
and:
“Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and in wartime.” 
In plain English:
• threats, “reminders”, public statements about nukes are not random emotional outbursts;
• they are a deliberate channel of pressure designed into the state policy.
So the whole line “if they really wanted war they wouldn’t telegraph it” just doesn’t hold. Telegraphed nuclear risk is the method. It’s meant to shape Western decision-making, slow weapons deliveries, split alliances, etc.
⸻
Fourth: “non-military measures” absolutely include targeting individuals
If you put Gerasimov’s text, the 2014 doctrine and the 2020 nuclear document next to each other and then compare with practice, the pattern is pretty obvious:
• full-spectrum conflict, no strict peace/war boundary 
• integrated use of informational, economic, political, and special-ops tools 
• constant nuclear deterrence + signalling to shape behaviour of adversary states 
Now add the open record of what Western inquiries say about Russian behavior:
• UK Litvinenko Inquiry: strong evidence that Russian state organs were behind his killing.
Report: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a8055c340f0b62302692e48/The-Litvinenko-Inquiry-H-C-695-web.pdf 
• 2018 Skripal / Novichok case: a UK public inquiry in 2025 concludes the operation was run by GRU, and that Putin bears responsibility / ordered it.
Short summary via Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/main-findings-uk-report-into-2018-novichok-incident-2025-12-04/ 
Context + “morally responsible” finding: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-04/uk-inquiry-findings-woman-2018-novichok-poisoning/106103644 
These are not vague blogs, this is official UK process saying:
state structures + highest leadership → responsible for targeted poisoning operations abroad.
Now compare that to “use of special operations, protest potential, non-military measures” in Russian doctrine. It fits like a glove. In practice this can include:
• intimidation and/or elimination of high-value opponents abroad;
• pressure and influence campaigns aimed at decision-makers;
• use of criminal/opaque financial networks for leverage (see work on “Crimintern” etc.). 
So when you talk about “corruption of top officials, assassinations, attempts” etc., you don’t even need to speculate wildly. You just need to:
1. read the doctrine (what tools are allowed),
2. look at documented practice (what tools are used),
3. understand this is not some side show — it is the war by their own definition.
⸻
Fifth: “the war is not on US territory” – ehh, that depends what you call war
If we accept Russian doctrinal framing (blurred peace/war, integrated non-military conflict), then US homeland is already part of the battlespace:
• cyber ops against infrastructure and government networks,
• info ops targeting elections, wedge issues, social conflict lines,
• influence campaigns via proxies, media outlets, botnets,
• attempts to access, compromise or pressure people in politics, business, tech, diaspora.
Western strategy papers literally describe this as “non-linear warfare”, “hybrid clash with NATO”, “active measures” etc. 
From Moscow’s perspective this is normal war below the threshold:
“strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle… including targets in its homeland.” 
So no, you don’t have tank columns rolling through New Jersey. But you absolutely have operations aimed at:
• your political decision-making,
• your social cohesion,
• your infrastructure and information space.
In the Gerasimov / 2014 doctrine paradigm, that’s not “peacetime”. That is the war.
⸻
Sixth: why the “just a bluff” take is dangerously shallow
The article you’re defending basically says (simplifying):
• Putin’s threat to NATO = bluff for negotiations;
• real danger = NATO overreacting to a bluff;
• Russia wants influence, not a big war.
Thing is:
1. Russian doctrine says:
• war is continuous,
• non-military + covert tools are core, not decorative,
• signalling & intimidation are structured into state policy. 
2. Russian practice shows:
• state-run or state-linked killings/poisonings abroad (Litvinenko, Skripal etc., per UK findings) 
• persistent hybrid / cyber / info ops against NATO states. 
3. Western official docs (NATO, CNA, etc.) describe Russian strategy as aiming to degrade an adversary’s will and ability, including in its homeland, before and below open conflict. 
Putting this together and then calling current threats “just a giant bluff” is not realism, it’s selective reading.
It downplays:
• the doctrinal decision to treat all domains as a single theatre of war,
• the integration of corruption / intimidation / assassinations / influence into the toolkit,
• the fact that US and European territory are already active targets in that toolkit.
You don’t have to scream “full-scale NATO–Russia war tomorrow” to acknowledge that this is not mere theatre. But you do have to, at minimum, read the playbook the other side actually published.
Right now the “giant bluff” narrative feels less like analysis and more like a comforting story for Western audiences who don’t want to admit that the war is already here – just not in the shape they were taught to recognize in Cold War textbooks.
Agree with you.
All of that is fascinating. And I am certainly not one to needlessly "poke the bear".
But let's look at this another way.
1. Vladimir Putin may have ruined the illusion that the Russian military is First World, he may have managed to de-Finlandize Finland (a true "geopolitical catastrophe" from Russia's point of view), but he's not an idiot. He's a very good negotiator, as the Russians have always been generally. He's going to posture to the maximum extent he can, as he should from his point of view, and Donald Trump is a fool if he doesn't see that and take it into account.
But Donald Trump is not a fool.
2. Now as to that illusion. First, Russia can't get to Warsaw or Berlin if in four years it can't get to Kiev, and that's all we need to know about Russia's "superpower" status. It's far from all we do know, but it's more than Putin knew when he tried to take Kiev and didn't have enough fuel for his tank columns. The Russian state is a web of corruption and lies, and the war has revealed them.
So what does that leave? Nukes? Sure. "Russian doctrine" can literally be anything, but Putin likes surviving, and he needs his country to not be an ash heap. And that's exactly what he's going to be -- dead in an ash heap that used to be a country -- if he decides to nuke not one but three very capable nuclear powers (because NATO has three, you know). And if anyone is stupid enough to think China will stick its neck out to help Russia in that situation, I ask you to tell me how many ground troops China has in Ukraine right now.
Russia is an important country. Russia's interests should not be lightly dismissed in the way that Clinton, Obama, and Biden dismissed them. But I'm sorry, I'm not afraid of a "power" with an economy smaller than Texas. And neither is this Administration. If Russia were somehow magically impervious to nuclear retaliation, I might think differently. But Russia can't even defend its refineries from Zelensky. So there's a distinct limit to their "awesomeness", and while we'd like a peace that's good for everybody, we're not suckers. For that, you'd have needed Kamala.
The game of thrones to destroy russia needs to stop. Russia needs to be integrated into the worlds economy. The "iron" bank is still the prime issue. Destruction of the bank is the prime directive.
Trump is giving them exactly that off-ramp. Putin overpromised to his constituencies and that's making this harder than it needs to be, and also, Putin is Russian and therefore maximalist in his demands by nature. Even so, Trump has no illusions about any of that. There can be a peace that's good for absolutely everyone. But we're going to need to check a few face-saving boxes that allow Putin the chance to survive (literally), and I think we're already mostly there (see the Deep Dive linked at the top of this article).