The threats are bunk. Putin’s “ready for war with Europe” line is bluff and leverage, a bargaining position not a battle plan. NATO’s real risk is not an invasion: it's taking Putin seriously.
ok so, here’s the thing, and sorry but this needs a long comment because the whole “Putin is just bluffing, NATO is overreacting” line is… kinda built on not reading the actual Russian doctrinal texts.
you don’t even need secret intel, just basic homework.
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First: Gerasimov literally tells you this is war already
In 2013 Valery Gerasimov writes “The Value of Science in Foresight” (Ценность науки в предвидении).
“the lines between war and peace are becoming blurred…
non-military means may in many cases exceed the power of weapons in their effectiveness”
This is their framing, not mine. No clear “peace vs war” binary. It’s a continuous conflict space.
So when you look at Putin’s “threats” to NATO and say “oh that’s just theater for the bargaining table”, you are imposing a Western IR 101 frame onto a doctrine that explicitly denies that frame. In this logic, information pressure, nuclear signalling, destabilisation, sabotage, all of it = legitimate tools of ongoing warfare.
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Second: the 2014 Military Doctrine literally spells out integrated non-military warfare
Go read the 2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (official translation, e.g.):
• special ops abroad (sabotage, covert action, etc.)
In other words: what we in the West would separately call corruption, disinformation, covert action, “foreign interference”, targeted intimidation of elites – in their military doctrine is part of the toolbox of war.
So when Western commentary treats all this as “just politics” and “not real war”, it’s basically disagreeing with the official Russian description of their own methods.
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Third: nuclear deterrence doctrine = threat as a planned instrument, not “empty talk”
2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”:
“a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design…” 
and:
“Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and in wartime.” 
In plain English:
• threats, “reminders”, public statements about nukes are not random emotional outbursts;
• they are a deliberate channel of pressure designed into the state policy.
So the whole line “if they really wanted war they wouldn’t telegraph it” just doesn’t hold. Telegraphed nuclear risk is the method. It’s meant to shape Western decision-making, slow weapons deliveries, split alliances, etc.
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Fourth: “non-military measures” absolutely include targeting individuals
If you put Gerasimov’s text, the 2014 doctrine and the 2020 nuclear document next to each other and then compare with practice, the pattern is pretty obvious:
• full-spectrum conflict, no strict peace/war boundary 
• integrated use of informational, economic, political, and special-ops tools 
• constant nuclear deterrence + signalling to shape behaviour of adversary states 
Now add the open record of what Western inquiries say about Russian behavior:
• UK Litvinenko Inquiry: strong evidence that Russian state organs were behind his killing.
These are not vague blogs, this is official UK process saying:
state structures + highest leadership → responsible for targeted poisoning operations abroad.
Now compare that to “use of special operations, protest potential, non-military measures” in Russian doctrine. It fits like a glove. In practice this can include:
• intimidation and/or elimination of high-value opponents abroad;
• pressure and influence campaigns aimed at decision-makers;
• use of criminal/opaque financial networks for leverage (see work on “Crimintern” etc.). 
So when you talk about “corruption of top officials, assassinations, attempts” etc., you don’t even need to speculate wildly. You just need to:
1. read the doctrine (what tools are allowed),
2. look at documented practice (what tools are used),
3. understand this is not some side show — it is the war by their own definition.
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Fifth: “the war is not on US territory” – ehh, that depends what you call war
If we accept Russian doctrinal framing (blurred peace/war, integrated non-military conflict), then US homeland is already part of the battlespace:
• cyber ops against infrastructure and government networks,
• info ops targeting elections, wedge issues, social conflict lines,
• influence campaigns via proxies, media outlets, botnets,
• attempts to access, compromise or pressure people in politics, business, tech, diaspora.
Western strategy papers literally describe this as “non-linear warfare”, “hybrid clash with NATO”, “active measures” etc. 
From Moscow’s perspective this is normal war below the threshold:
“strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle… including targets in its homeland.” 
So no, you don’t have tank columns rolling through New Jersey. But you absolutely have operations aimed at:
• your political decision-making,
• your social cohesion,
• your infrastructure and information space.
In the Gerasimov / 2014 doctrine paradigm, that’s not “peacetime”. That is the war.
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Sixth: why the “just a bluff” take is dangerously shallow
The article you’re defending basically says (simplifying):
• Putin’s threat to NATO = bluff for negotiations;
• real danger = NATO overreacting to a bluff;
• Russia wants influence, not a big war.
Thing is:
1. Russian doctrine says:
• war is continuous,
• non-military + covert tools are core, not decorative,
• signalling & intimidation are structured into state policy. 
2. Russian practice shows:
• state-run or state-linked killings/poisonings abroad (Litvinenko, Skripal etc., per UK findings) 
• persistent hybrid / cyber / info ops against NATO states. 
3. Western official docs (NATO, CNA, etc.) describe Russian strategy as aiming to degrade an adversary’s will and ability, including in its homeland, before and below open conflict. 
Putting this together and then calling current threats “just a giant bluff” is not realism, it’s selective reading.
It downplays:
• the doctrinal decision to treat all domains as a single theatre of war,
• the integration of corruption / intimidation / assassinations / influence into the toolkit,
• the fact that US and European territory are already active targets in that toolkit.
You don’t have to scream “full-scale NATO–Russia war tomorrow” to acknowledge that this is not mere theatre. But you do have to, at minimum, read the playbook the other side actually published.
Right now the “giant bluff” narrative feels less like analysis and more like a comforting story for Western audiences who don’t want to admit that the war is already here – just not in the shape they were taught to recognize in Cold War textbooks.
All of that is fascinating. And I am certainly not one to needlessly "poke the bear".
But let's look at this another way.
1. Vladimir Putin may have ruined the illusion that the Russian military is First World, he may have managed to de-Finlandize Finland (a true "geopolitical catastrophe" from Russia's point of view), but he's not an idiot. He's a very good negotiator, as the Russians have always been generally. He's going to posture to the maximum extent he can, as he should from his point of view, and Donald Trump is a fool if he doesn't see that and take it into account.
But Donald Trump is not a fool.
2. Now as to that illusion. First, Russia can't get to Warsaw or Berlin if in four years it can't get to Kiev, and that's all we need to know about Russia's "superpower" status. It's far from all we do know, but it's more than Putin knew when he tried to take Kiev and didn't have enough fuel for his tank columns. The Russian state is a web of corruption and lies, and the war has revealed them.
So what does that leave? Nukes? Sure. "Russian doctrine" can literally be anything, but Putin likes surviving, and he needs his country to not be an ash heap. And that's exactly what he's going to be -- dead in an ash heap that used to be a country -- if he decides to nuke not one but three very capable nuclear powers (because NATO has three, you know). And if anyone is stupid enough to think China will stick its neck out to help Russia in that situation, I ask you to tell me how many ground troops China has in Ukraine right now.
Russia is an important country. Russia's interests should not be lightly dismissed in the way that Clinton, Obama, and Biden dismissed them. But I'm sorry, I'm not afraid of a "power" with an economy smaller than Texas. And neither is this Administration. If Russia were somehow magically impervious to nuclear retaliation, I might think differently. But Russia can't even defend its refineries from Zelensky. So there's a distinct limit to their "awesomeness", and while we'd like a peace that's good for everybody, we're not suckers. For that, you'd have needed Kamala.
Look, let me be a slightly cynical old monkey for a minute, not Peter Pan. The whole stack of lines you’re using — “he’s a good negotiator,” “he loves life,” “Russia is important but its GDP is smaller than Texas,” “it’s just a bluff,” “China has no troops in Ukraine”, plenty of them, these are not facts. They’re what political literature calls shaping theses with reinforcement. Individually they sound fine. Together they build one emotional outcome: relax, Russia is only scary on paper. That’s the part that feels off.
“Good negotiator.” That’s not analysis, that’s a frame. And let’s be blunt: Putin does not negotiate, Putin recruits. This isn’t a metaphor — it’s the operational culture he was raised in. Even Angela Merkel said after years of dealing with him that he lives in “a completely different reality,” basically “nuts,” which fits perfectly with an intelligence mindset where every meeting is a cultivation attempt, not a search for compromise.
“He loves life.” Every dictator loves life. It tells you zero about risk tolerance, escalation logic, or how safe he feels inside his own power structure. Leaders with no internal constraints often take bigger risks because they assume nothing can touch them. And in Putin’s case, nothing actually does: his life isn’t threatened by rivals, elections, institutions, or public pressure. No one inside Russia can realistically hope to succeed at removing him — so basing risk assessment on the idea that he ‘fears for his life’ simply misreads the entire structure he sits on. This line works emotionally, not analytically: “he loves life, so he won’t escalate” is projection, not understanding.
“Russia is important but GDP smaller than Texas.” Yes, the GDP number is true. But the military comparison is completely misunderstood: Texas versus Russia in pure force terms is a toddler versus a rhinoceros, no matter what Texas thinks about itself. GDP doesn’t turn a toddler into a tank brigade, and it doesn’t erase a nuclear triad. Importance in the Russian case comes from nuclear arsenal, geography, energy leverage, intelligence capability, cyber capacity, and a willingness to use tools others won’t. Their doctrine literally integrates military and non‑military pressure, foreign sabotage, information ops, and controlled escalation. GDP tells you almost nothing about threat level. And here’s the other part: Russia isn’t trying to stand next to Texas — it’s trying, by every mostly non‑conventional method it has, to stand next to the United States itself. And judging by how the U.S. reacts to Russian moves globally, that ambition is unfortunately not unrealistic.
“It’s just a bluff.” This sits on top of the previous frames. After “good negotiator,” “loves life,” “small GDP,” and “no Chinese troops,” the conclusion feels obvious. But it ignores decades of assassinations and attempted assassinations in NATO countries, cyberattacks costing billions, sabotage, election interference, kompromat operations, nuclear signaling, and the fact that Russia often escalates precisely when the West assumes “it’s just a bluff.” It’s not a lie — it’s a comforting wish.
The China argument is built the same way. “No Chinese troops in Ukraine” is the wrong metric. China doesn’t need troops there. North Korean proxies provide manpower, China provides tech, components, economic oxygen, and geopolitical cover. Meanwhile Chinese soldiers are busy pushing American influence out of Africa. Wrong test, wrong conclusion.
Individually none of these lines are unreasonable. Together they create a package that gently steers the reader toward one place: don’t worry, the threat is exaggerated. And that’s exactly why it feels like an information operation. The structure matches the pattern Moscow prefers the West to absorb: underestimate doctrine, underestimate tools, misunderstand risk calculus, and believe everything is theater.
And honestly, there are far more of these shaping‑with‑reinforcement theses in circulation. They’re packed so tightly and delivered so smoothly that eventually it stops looking like coincidence and starts feeling like a Russian information op passing through — or still active.
You seem very serious about making the case for an unstoppably dangerous Russia. So why haven't they just nuked Ukraine? Why haven't they been able to move the front meaningfully in three years? Where is that "alliance without limits" with China, because we've seen plenty of limits for four years now? And why are we supposed to think that Russia benefits in any way from launching a nuclear attack on the United States, France, or Britain?
You're giving me a lot of narrative about how awesome and mighty Russia is, but it doesn't stand up well against what's actually happening.
There is exactly one field where Russia really is the most effective player in the world – and it’s not tank warfare or high-tech industry. It’s the field described in detail by what we usually call the Gerasimov Doctrine.
That field is the grey zone between war and peace: information operations, corruption, political influence, energy blackmail, psychological pressure, nuclear hints, legal sabotage, and constant low-level military actions that never quite cross the “open war with NATO” line. This is where Moscow genuinely knows what it’s doing and has been iterating for decades.
On a conventional battlefield Russia is clumsy, wasteful and often incompetent. But in this hybrid space – the space of narratives, backroom deals, kompromat, bought politicians, weaponized media and manufactured “peace initiatives” – they are systematic, patient and absolutely ruthless. They don’t need to win a clean war. They just need to slowly rot their opponent’s will to resist.
The most depressing part is that this is exactly the terrain where the current U.S. and European political elites walk in like a blind puppy: overconfident, under-informed, convinced they’re dealing with a normal state that will respond to “dialogue” and “confidence-building measures.” Russia is playing long-form hybrid warfare. Washington and Brussels keep acting like it’s a slightly complicated diplomatic misunderstanding.
Oh how I love the comments on Russia being nothing but a web of lies and deceit. Like the western world isn’t. Ffs, get on with some real honesty here. And yes I think Trump is the one person who can do some sort of dealing with Putin. But it will never be on a western level.
You're absolutely free to believe in Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, Marlboro Country, or those safe 80% annual returns.
But when it comes to actual treaties between the United States and Russia, the record is painfully one‑sided and fully documented.
1. INF Treaty (1987)
The U.S. destroyed every single ground‑launched intermediate‑range missile it possessed. Russia, meanwhile, secretly developed and deployed the 9M729 system — exactly the class of missile the treaty explicitly banned. NATO formally documented this violation.
2. Open Skies Treaty (1992)
The U.S. allowed unrestricted surveillance flights over its entire territory. Russia systematically blocked routes over Kaliningrad and near Georgia — a direct violation of the treaty’s core principle of equal, nondiscriminatory access.
3. New START (2010)
The U.S. complied with inspections and data exchanges. Russia blocked inspections, halted data sharing, and declared an illegal "suspension" of the treaty while continuing to demand its benefits.
Three major treaties.
Three times the U.S. upheld its obligations.
Three times Russia violated or dismantled the regime.
The economic and military consequences for the U.S. were straightforward: reduced arsenals, reduced strategic flexibility, reduced leverage, and hundreds of billions of dollars in cumulative losses over decades.
—
In April 1917, after the February Revolution, Woodrow Wilson delivered a speech praising that “Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart.”
A few months later came the Bolshevik coup, the murder of the royal family, mass executions, civil war, famine, repression, and the long, bloody century that defined Russia as the world knows it.
This isn’t about the West being perfect. It’s about recognizing that every cycle of trusting Moscow to act in good faith ends with the same outcome.
And regarding the idea that “Trump can make a deal with Putin”:
Putin doesn’t negotiate. He recruits.
If someone walks out of a meeting with him wearing a glowing, happy, enlightened smile — it doesn’t mean the deal went well.
Alex, all of this is correct except the part about negotiating an ending. But that's a separate discussion. The Russians have never kept a treaty and they aren't going to start now. That part gets left out by most of the people making the case that this is all the West's fault.
Now, I'd say it IS our fault in that we were dumb enough to elect Obama and Biden. But that's a different matter.
The game of thrones to destroy russia needs to stop. Russia needs to be integrated into the worlds economy. The "iron" bank is still the prime issue. Destruction of the bank is the prime directive.
Trump is giving them exactly that off-ramp. Putin overpromised to his constituencies and that's making this harder than it needs to be, and also, Putin is Russian and therefore maximalist in his demands by nature. Even so, Trump has no illusions about any of that. There can be a peace that's good for absolutely everyone. But we're going to need to check a few face-saving boxes that allow Putin the chance to survive (literally), and I think we're already mostly there (see the Deep Dive linked at the top of this article).
You talk about face saving for Putin. What about face saving for NATO scumbags. Go back to the deal that was done to stop NATO from coming in to close. They crossed a line they had no right to. Now those bullies won’t back down for fear of losing face. And because they are invading bullies.
Yeah, we're two wars past that. Clinton could have upheld the deal to not expand NATO eastward. Obama could have stopped the first war by enforcing the agreement you reference. Biden could have stopped the second (current) war by not saying his response would depend on whether it was a "serious" invasion or not (I was not aware that there were unserious invasions, but go figure).
So now we're dealing with the reality that exists, not the reality of 1994, 2013, or 2021.
If you're willing to send the U.S. Army to kick Russia out, well, good for you. But no American President of either party has been willing, so odds are, they aren't getting kicked out.
Sorry to interrupt, but there have never been any formal agreements or signed documents about this so-called “NATO non-expansion to the East.” NATO also never limited its own sovereignty when it comes to admitting new member states.
Article 10 of the NATO Treaty is clear: any European state can be invited by unanimous agreement. This rule has never been changed or restricted.
Gorbachev himself later said that no general promise about NATO’s borders was ever made. The talks in 1990 were only about German reunification, not Eastern Europe.
And just for context: it was George W. Bush who supported and approved the accession of the Baltic and Balkan countries to NATO, and it was Donald Trump who approved Montenegro’s accession.
Post-Soviet Russia was never a party to any agreement defining NATO’s membership boundaries or giving Moscow any kind of veto.
I don't think Montenegro really counts as eastward expansion after you've already added nearly the entire Warsaw Pact.
Otherwise this is true, although there are two points of dispute:
1. It is not unreasonable for Russia to see Baker's promise as broken, regardless of what Baker might have meant.
2. It is just generally foolish for us to have suggested that we were going to let Ukraine join NATO, when that effectively puts the German army two days' march from Red Square, thus reversing the outcome of World War II.
The correct solution was always to Finlandize Ukraine. It worked just fine for Finland. And we could have provided Article 5-like guarantees without any forward deployment of troops.
We’ve already discussed this, I think. The idea of “Finlandization” for Ukraine looks beautiful to everyone except for two facts. First, it’s impossible to guarantee. Second, the entire post–WWII convention framework has changed so much that it’s impossible to implement. As a result, given everything stated above, the idea of Finlandization is worthless even in theory.
You obviously did not understand what I said at all. I actually agree that the cia and mi6 are very responsible. My point is that russia needs to be integrated not demonized. Ukraine was chock full of dirty money, human trafficking and biological warfare labs. The cia is highly skilled at fomenting war and revolution.
And this is the problem with society on every level. Don’t look back and own previous mistakes so we can go forward in a better way. Remember the Chinese also have a long memory. The west is just ignorant and disrespectful on most levels. We are no better and just as big a bully if not more so.
ok so, here’s the thing, and sorry but this needs a long comment because the whole “Putin is just bluffing, NATO is overreacting” line is… kinda built on not reading the actual Russian doctrinal texts.
you don’t even need secret intel, just basic homework.
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First: Gerasimov literally tells you this is war already
In 2013 Valery Gerasimov writes “The Value of Science in Foresight” (Ценность науки в предвидении).
English discussion + refs here:
• https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/how-russia-does-foresight 
• English translation used in a lot of papers, e.g. Small Wars Journal: http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf 
He literally says that:
“the lines between war and peace are becoming blurred…
non-military means may in many cases exceed the power of weapons in their effectiveness”
This is their framing, not mine. No clear “peace vs war” binary. It’s a continuous conflict space.
So when you look at Putin’s “threats” to NATO and say “oh that’s just theater for the bargaining table”, you are imposing a Western IR 101 frame onto a doctrine that explicitly denies that frame. In this logic, information pressure, nuclear signalling, destabilisation, sabotage, all of it = legitimate tools of ongoing warfare.
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Second: the 2014 Military Doctrine literally spells out integrated non-military warfare
Go read the 2014 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (official translation, e.g.):
• PDF mirror: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mildoc_rf_2014_eng.pdf 
• Or text mirror: https://michaelbommarito.com/wiki/nato/documents/russian-military-doctrine-2014/ 
Characteristic features of modern conflict there include (paraphrasing the English version):
integrated use of military force and political, economic, informational and other non-military measures,
with widespread use of the protest potential of the population and special operations
That’s not my “conspiracy take”, that’s the doctrine.
So yeah, let’s translate that into normal language:
• information ops
• pressure and influence on officials
• money, kompromat, blackmail, “friendly intermediaries”
• activation / manipulation of protest movements
• special ops abroad (sabotage, covert action, etc.)
In other words: what we in the West would separately call corruption, disinformation, covert action, “foreign interference”, targeted intimidation of elites – in their military doctrine is part of the toolbox of war.
So when Western commentary treats all this as “just politics” and “not real war”, it’s basically disagreeing with the official Russian description of their own methods.
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Third: nuclear deterrence doctrine = threat as a planned instrument, not “empty talk”
2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”:
• English text: https://www.russiamatters.org/2020-basic-principles-state-policy-russian-federation-nuclear-deterrence 
• Or direct ENG PDF: https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/nucdet_rf_2020_eng.pdf 
Look at how they define deterrence:
“a set of political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures, coordinated and united by a common design…” 
and:
“Nuclear deterrence is ensured continuously in peacetime, in periods of a direct threat of aggression and in wartime.” 
In plain English:
• threats, “reminders”, public statements about nukes are not random emotional outbursts;
• they are a deliberate channel of pressure designed into the state policy.
So the whole line “if they really wanted war they wouldn’t telegraph it” just doesn’t hold. Telegraphed nuclear risk is the method. It’s meant to shape Western decision-making, slow weapons deliveries, split alliances, etc.
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Fourth: “non-military measures” absolutely include targeting individuals
If you put Gerasimov’s text, the 2014 doctrine and the 2020 nuclear document next to each other and then compare with practice, the pattern is pretty obvious:
• full-spectrum conflict, no strict peace/war boundary 
• integrated use of informational, economic, political, and special-ops tools 
• constant nuclear deterrence + signalling to shape behaviour of adversary states 
Now add the open record of what Western inquiries say about Russian behavior:
• UK Litvinenko Inquiry: strong evidence that Russian state organs were behind his killing.
Report: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a8055c340f0b62302692e48/The-Litvinenko-Inquiry-H-C-695-web.pdf 
• 2018 Skripal / Novichok case: a UK public inquiry in 2025 concludes the operation was run by GRU, and that Putin bears responsibility / ordered it.
Short summary via Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/main-findings-uk-report-into-2018-novichok-incident-2025-12-04/ 
Context + “morally responsible” finding: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-12-04/uk-inquiry-findings-woman-2018-novichok-poisoning/106103644 
These are not vague blogs, this is official UK process saying:
state structures + highest leadership → responsible for targeted poisoning operations abroad.
Now compare that to “use of special operations, protest potential, non-military measures” in Russian doctrine. It fits like a glove. In practice this can include:
• intimidation and/or elimination of high-value opponents abroad;
• pressure and influence campaigns aimed at decision-makers;
• use of criminal/opaque financial networks for leverage (see work on “Crimintern” etc.). 
So when you talk about “corruption of top officials, assassinations, attempts” etc., you don’t even need to speculate wildly. You just need to:
1. read the doctrine (what tools are allowed),
2. look at documented practice (what tools are used),
3. understand this is not some side show — it is the war by their own definition.
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Fifth: “the war is not on US territory” – ehh, that depends what you call war
If we accept Russian doctrinal framing (blurred peace/war, integrated non-military conflict), then US homeland is already part of the battlespace:
• cyber ops against infrastructure and government networks,
• info ops targeting elections, wedge issues, social conflict lines,
• influence campaigns via proxies, media outlets, botnets,
• attempts to access, compromise or pressure people in politics, business, tech, diaspora.
Western strategy papers literally describe this as “non-linear warfare”, “hybrid clash with NATO”, “active measures” etc. 
From Moscow’s perspective this is normal war below the threshold:
“strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle… including targets in its homeland.” 
So no, you don’t have tank columns rolling through New Jersey. But you absolutely have operations aimed at:
• your political decision-making,
• your social cohesion,
• your infrastructure and information space.
In the Gerasimov / 2014 doctrine paradigm, that’s not “peacetime”. That is the war.
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Sixth: why the “just a bluff” take is dangerously shallow
The article you’re defending basically says (simplifying):
• Putin’s threat to NATO = bluff for negotiations;
• real danger = NATO overreacting to a bluff;
• Russia wants influence, not a big war.
Thing is:
1. Russian doctrine says:
• war is continuous,
• non-military + covert tools are core, not decorative,
• signalling & intimidation are structured into state policy. 
2. Russian practice shows:
• state-run or state-linked killings/poisonings abroad (Litvinenko, Skripal etc., per UK findings) 
• persistent hybrid / cyber / info ops against NATO states. 
3. Western official docs (NATO, CNA, etc.) describe Russian strategy as aiming to degrade an adversary’s will and ability, including in its homeland, before and below open conflict. 
Putting this together and then calling current threats “just a giant bluff” is not realism, it’s selective reading.
It downplays:
• the doctrinal decision to treat all domains as a single theatre of war,
• the integration of corruption / intimidation / assassinations / influence into the toolkit,
• the fact that US and European territory are already active targets in that toolkit.
You don’t have to scream “full-scale NATO–Russia war tomorrow” to acknowledge that this is not mere theatre. But you do have to, at minimum, read the playbook the other side actually published.
Right now the “giant bluff” narrative feels less like analysis and more like a comforting story for Western audiences who don’t want to admit that the war is already here – just not in the shape they were taught to recognize in Cold War textbooks.
Agree with you.
All of that is fascinating. And I am certainly not one to needlessly "poke the bear".
But let's look at this another way.
1. Vladimir Putin may have ruined the illusion that the Russian military is First World, he may have managed to de-Finlandize Finland (a true "geopolitical catastrophe" from Russia's point of view), but he's not an idiot. He's a very good negotiator, as the Russians have always been generally. He's going to posture to the maximum extent he can, as he should from his point of view, and Donald Trump is a fool if he doesn't see that and take it into account.
But Donald Trump is not a fool.
2. Now as to that illusion. First, Russia can't get to Warsaw or Berlin if in four years it can't get to Kiev, and that's all we need to know about Russia's "superpower" status. It's far from all we do know, but it's more than Putin knew when he tried to take Kiev and didn't have enough fuel for his tank columns. The Russian state is a web of corruption and lies, and the war has revealed them.
So what does that leave? Nukes? Sure. "Russian doctrine" can literally be anything, but Putin likes surviving, and he needs his country to not be an ash heap. And that's exactly what he's going to be -- dead in an ash heap that used to be a country -- if he decides to nuke not one but three very capable nuclear powers (because NATO has three, you know). And if anyone is stupid enough to think China will stick its neck out to help Russia in that situation, I ask you to tell me how many ground troops China has in Ukraine right now.
Russia is an important country. Russia's interests should not be lightly dismissed in the way that Clinton, Obama, and Biden dismissed them. But I'm sorry, I'm not afraid of a "power" with an economy smaller than Texas. And neither is this Administration. If Russia were somehow magically impervious to nuclear retaliation, I might think differently. But Russia can't even defend its refineries from Zelensky. So there's a distinct limit to their "awesomeness", and while we'd like a peace that's good for everybody, we're not suckers. For that, you'd have needed Kamala.
Look, let me be a slightly cynical old monkey for a minute, not Peter Pan. The whole stack of lines you’re using — “he’s a good negotiator,” “he loves life,” “Russia is important but its GDP is smaller than Texas,” “it’s just a bluff,” “China has no troops in Ukraine”, plenty of them, these are not facts. They’re what political literature calls shaping theses with reinforcement. Individually they sound fine. Together they build one emotional outcome: relax, Russia is only scary on paper. That’s the part that feels off.
“Good negotiator.” That’s not analysis, that’s a frame. And let’s be blunt: Putin does not negotiate, Putin recruits. This isn’t a metaphor — it’s the operational culture he was raised in. Even Angela Merkel said after years of dealing with him that he lives in “a completely different reality,” basically “nuts,” which fits perfectly with an intelligence mindset where every meeting is a cultivation attempt, not a search for compromise.
“He loves life.” Every dictator loves life. It tells you zero about risk tolerance, escalation logic, or how safe he feels inside his own power structure. Leaders with no internal constraints often take bigger risks because they assume nothing can touch them. And in Putin’s case, nothing actually does: his life isn’t threatened by rivals, elections, institutions, or public pressure. No one inside Russia can realistically hope to succeed at removing him — so basing risk assessment on the idea that he ‘fears for his life’ simply misreads the entire structure he sits on. This line works emotionally, not analytically: “he loves life, so he won’t escalate” is projection, not understanding.
“Russia is important but GDP smaller than Texas.” Yes, the GDP number is true. But the military comparison is completely misunderstood: Texas versus Russia in pure force terms is a toddler versus a rhinoceros, no matter what Texas thinks about itself. GDP doesn’t turn a toddler into a tank brigade, and it doesn’t erase a nuclear triad. Importance in the Russian case comes from nuclear arsenal, geography, energy leverage, intelligence capability, cyber capacity, and a willingness to use tools others won’t. Their doctrine literally integrates military and non‑military pressure, foreign sabotage, information ops, and controlled escalation. GDP tells you almost nothing about threat level. And here’s the other part: Russia isn’t trying to stand next to Texas — it’s trying, by every mostly non‑conventional method it has, to stand next to the United States itself. And judging by how the U.S. reacts to Russian moves globally, that ambition is unfortunately not unrealistic.
“It’s just a bluff.” This sits on top of the previous frames. After “good negotiator,” “loves life,” “small GDP,” and “no Chinese troops,” the conclusion feels obvious. But it ignores decades of assassinations and attempted assassinations in NATO countries, cyberattacks costing billions, sabotage, election interference, kompromat operations, nuclear signaling, and the fact that Russia often escalates precisely when the West assumes “it’s just a bluff.” It’s not a lie — it’s a comforting wish.
The China argument is built the same way. “No Chinese troops in Ukraine” is the wrong metric. China doesn’t need troops there. North Korean proxies provide manpower, China provides tech, components, economic oxygen, and geopolitical cover. Meanwhile Chinese soldiers are busy pushing American influence out of Africa. Wrong test, wrong conclusion.
Individually none of these lines are unreasonable. Together they create a package that gently steers the reader toward one place: don’t worry, the threat is exaggerated. And that’s exactly why it feels like an information operation. The structure matches the pattern Moscow prefers the West to absorb: underestimate doctrine, underestimate tools, misunderstand risk calculus, and believe everything is theater.
And honestly, there are far more of these shaping‑with‑reinforcement theses in circulation. They’re packed so tightly and delivered so smoothly that eventually it stops looking like coincidence and starts feeling like a Russian information op passing through — or still active.
You seem very serious about making the case for an unstoppably dangerous Russia. So why haven't they just nuked Ukraine? Why haven't they been able to move the front meaningfully in three years? Where is that "alliance without limits" with China, because we've seen plenty of limits for four years now? And why are we supposed to think that Russia benefits in any way from launching a nuclear attack on the United States, France, or Britain?
You're giving me a lot of narrative about how awesome and mighty Russia is, but it doesn't stand up well against what's actually happening.
There is exactly one field where Russia really is the most effective player in the world – and it’s not tank warfare or high-tech industry. It’s the field described in detail by what we usually call the Gerasimov Doctrine.
That field is the grey zone between war and peace: information operations, corruption, political influence, energy blackmail, psychological pressure, nuclear hints, legal sabotage, and constant low-level military actions that never quite cross the “open war with NATO” line. This is where Moscow genuinely knows what it’s doing and has been iterating for decades.
On a conventional battlefield Russia is clumsy, wasteful and often incompetent. But in this hybrid space – the space of narratives, backroom deals, kompromat, bought politicians, weaponized media and manufactured “peace initiatives” – they are systematic, patient and absolutely ruthless. They don’t need to win a clean war. They just need to slowly rot their opponent’s will to resist.
The most depressing part is that this is exactly the terrain where the current U.S. and European political elites walk in like a blind puppy: overconfident, under-informed, convinced they’re dealing with a normal state that will respond to “dialogue” and “confidence-building measures.” Russia is playing long-form hybrid warfare. Washington and Brussels keep acting like it’s a slightly complicated diplomatic misunderstanding.
Oh how I love the comments on Russia being nothing but a web of lies and deceit. Like the western world isn’t. Ffs, get on with some real honesty here. And yes I think Trump is the one person who can do some sort of dealing with Putin. But it will never be on a western level.
You're absolutely free to believe in Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, Marlboro Country, or those safe 80% annual returns.
But when it comes to actual treaties between the United States and Russia, the record is painfully one‑sided and fully documented.
1. INF Treaty (1987)
The U.S. destroyed every single ground‑launched intermediate‑range missile it possessed. Russia, meanwhile, secretly developed and deployed the 9M729 system — exactly the class of missile the treaty explicitly banned. NATO formally documented this violation.
2. Open Skies Treaty (1992)
The U.S. allowed unrestricted surveillance flights over its entire territory. Russia systematically blocked routes over Kaliningrad and near Georgia — a direct violation of the treaty’s core principle of equal, nondiscriminatory access.
3. New START (2010)
The U.S. complied with inspections and data exchanges. Russia blocked inspections, halted data sharing, and declared an illegal "suspension" of the treaty while continuing to demand its benefits.
Three major treaties.
Three times the U.S. upheld its obligations.
Three times Russia violated or dismantled the regime.
The economic and military consequences for the U.S. were straightforward: reduced arsenals, reduced strategic flexibility, reduced leverage, and hundreds of billions of dollars in cumulative losses over decades.
—
In April 1917, after the February Revolution, Woodrow Wilson delivered a speech praising that “Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart.”
[https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/world-history/euro-hist/american-entry-world-war-i/a/wilsons-war-message-to-congress-april-2-1917](https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/world-history/euro-hist/american-entry-world-war-i/a/wilsons-war-message-to-congress-april-2-1917)
A few months later came the Bolshevik coup, the murder of the royal family, mass executions, civil war, famine, repression, and the long, bloody century that defined Russia as the world knows it.
This isn’t about the West being perfect. It’s about recognizing that every cycle of trusting Moscow to act in good faith ends with the same outcome.
And regarding the idea that “Trump can make a deal with Putin”:
Putin doesn’t negotiate. He recruits.
If someone walks out of a meeting with him wearing a glowing, happy, enlightened smile — it doesn’t mean the deal went well.
It means the recruitment went well.
Alex, all of this is correct except the part about negotiating an ending. But that's a separate discussion. The Russians have never kept a treaty and they aren't going to start now. That part gets left out by most of the people making the case that this is all the West's fault.
Now, I'd say it IS our fault in that we were dumb enough to elect Obama and Biden. But that's a different matter.
The game of thrones to destroy russia needs to stop. Russia needs to be integrated into the worlds economy. The "iron" bank is still the prime issue. Destruction of the bank is the prime directive.
Trump is giving them exactly that off-ramp. Putin overpromised to his constituencies and that's making this harder than it needs to be, and also, Putin is Russian and therefore maximalist in his demands by nature. Even so, Trump has no illusions about any of that. There can be a peace that's good for absolutely everyone. But we're going to need to check a few face-saving boxes that allow Putin the chance to survive (literally), and I think we're already mostly there (see the Deep Dive linked at the top of this article).
You talk about face saving for Putin. What about face saving for NATO scumbags. Go back to the deal that was done to stop NATO from coming in to close. They crossed a line they had no right to. Now those bullies won’t back down for fear of losing face. And because they are invading bullies.
Yeah, we're two wars past that. Clinton could have upheld the deal to not expand NATO eastward. Obama could have stopped the first war by enforcing the agreement you reference. Biden could have stopped the second (current) war by not saying his response would depend on whether it was a "serious" invasion or not (I was not aware that there were unserious invasions, but go figure).
So now we're dealing with the reality that exists, not the reality of 1994, 2013, or 2021.
If you're willing to send the U.S. Army to kick Russia out, well, good for you. But no American President of either party has been willing, so odds are, they aren't getting kicked out.
Next suggestion?
Sorry to interrupt, but there have never been any formal agreements or signed documents about this so-called “NATO non-expansion to the East.” NATO also never limited its own sovereignty when it comes to admitting new member states.
Article 10 of the NATO Treaty is clear: any European state can be invited by unanimous agreement. This rule has never been changed or restricted.
Gorbachev himself later said that no general promise about NATO’s borders was ever made. The talks in 1990 were only about German reunification, not Eastern Europe.
And just for context: it was George W. Bush who supported and approved the accession of the Baltic and Balkan countries to NATO, and it was Donald Trump who approved Montenegro’s accession.
Post-Soviet Russia was never a party to any agreement defining NATO’s membership boundaries or giving Moscow any kind of veto.
I don't think Montenegro really counts as eastward expansion after you've already added nearly the entire Warsaw Pact.
Otherwise this is true, although there are two points of dispute:
1. It is not unreasonable for Russia to see Baker's promise as broken, regardless of what Baker might have meant.
2. It is just generally foolish for us to have suggested that we were going to let Ukraine join NATO, when that effectively puts the German army two days' march from Red Square, thus reversing the outcome of World War II.
The correct solution was always to Finlandize Ukraine. It worked just fine for Finland. And we could have provided Article 5-like guarantees without any forward deployment of troops.
But Obama and Biden did not want that solution.
We’ve already discussed this, I think. The idea of “Finlandization” for Ukraine looks beautiful to everyone except for two facts. First, it’s impossible to guarantee. Second, the entire post–WWII convention framework has changed so much that it’s impossible to implement. As a result, given everything stated above, the idea of Finlandization is worthless even in theory.
I don't think that's true at all. Nevertheless, what would you prefer?
The map is not the territory.
For now, the only thing on the table is war, in complete encirclement and with total betrayal by former partners.
I wrote about a Tomahawk strike on Kyiv six months ago; since then it’s only gotten worse.
There are no other options on the table.
You obviously did not understand what I said at all. I actually agree that the cia and mi6 are very responsible. My point is that russia needs to be integrated not demonized. Ukraine was chock full of dirty money, human trafficking and biological warfare labs. The cia is highly skilled at fomenting war and revolution.
And this is the problem with society on every level. Don’t look back and own previous mistakes so we can go forward in a better way. Remember the Chinese also have a long memory. The west is just ignorant and disrespectful on most levels. We are no better and just as big a bully if not more so.