Trump is arming Taiwan with HIMARS, ATACMS, howitzers, and the new Precision Strike Missiles, or PrSMs — turning China’s landing fleet into a target set, not a war plan.
One minor technical point: ATACMS range is 300 km, not 165 km. The earliest versions, produced in the 1990s (Block I), had the range of 165 km, but that's old news by now. Block I missiles are also at the end of their shelf life at this point in time. Current ATACMS versions are 300 km.
***
On a different note, the idea that China is planning to invade in 2027 is, in my opinion, a psyop. First, I don't believe that something like this would be leaked by China inadvertently - any such "leak" is a deliberate disinformation. If China says 2027, then the real date (to the extent there is a specific real date) is something other than 2027. Since it presumably isn't 2026, it must be after 2027, when everyone breathes a sigh of relief on December 31, 2027, and says "Okey dokey then, we're safe, no invasion."
In my dilettante's view, China is not capable of a SUCCESSFUL seaborne invasion. First, there are only two successful examples of major seaborne invasions in the entire human history: D-day in 1944, and Okinawa in 1945. Both were across essentially uncontested waters, by armies that had years of combat experience, onto landing grounds conducive to such things. China's military has zero combat experience, the Taiwan Strait will be very much contested, and Taiwan's coast has virtually no beaches where an invading force can land.
Could Xi Jinping order it anyway? Anything is possible, but (again, in my dilettante's view) it is doomed to failure AND to a huge loss of face. The risk of the latter is another constraining factor.
One cautionary note: We think of the future invasion of Taiwan as a sort of "D-Day with Chinese characteristics", just using technology of the 2020s. But China's plan will no doubt rely to a much greater extent on pre-positioned special forces teams already on the island striking key targets and causing general chaos, as well as the local Fifth Column (the KMT) loudly calling for immediate capitulation.
I also agree with your assessment of Chinese capabilities. We have a lot of smart people on our side who take "being ready by 2027" as "going to invade in 2027", but I think that's a mistake, not least in that I don't think they'll actually be ready.
The dangers are:
1. Xi Jinping has purged all the guys who had real combat experience and left only yesmen. So if he gets up on the wrong side of the bed one morning, we could have a problem.
2. The Chinese demographic collapse is accelerating. They really need to grab whatever they're going to in the next decade or there may never be another chance. They're not unaware, and this was part of Putin's logic in Ukraine too.
That said, I think Trump's strategy is calculated to address all of that. "Make the steal more expensive than it's worth." If war is likely to end badly, trade looks like a better option. It may not be -- ask Gorbachev -- but that's more an internal matter than an external one.
William the Conqueror had a total of something like 10,000 men. (Estimates vary.) It was certainly respectable for that time, but I am talking about MAJOR invasions.
Also, recall that the landing itself was unopposed - William didn't have to fight for the beach where he landed.
The Allied landing in Italy in 1943, and perhaps MarArthur's landing at Inchon, could conceivably qualify as the only other examples that I am aware of, with some qualifiers. These, incidentally, also illustrate the points I made earlier: they are operations by armies with years of combat experience, using uncontested waters, in places where the terrain was conducive to such things.
I am more and more convinced that the Chicoms will go for a blockade rather than out right invasion.
That has always been in fact the logical choice because even without these latest weapons invading Taiwan is not a walk in the park and occupying, assuming any resistance is even worse. The mountainous east is tailor made for guerilla warfare and artillery, drones and missiles launched from that area can hit just about anywhere.
The new weapons do of course make invasion less likely especially because the PLA has seen how well they work against PLA radars etc. in Venezuela and Iran. There have been a number of arrests, changes of personnel and disappearances in the PLA and defense industries that seem to linked to the poor performance of Chinese hardware in both events this year. Something I discussed back in January when we had only seen the Maduro action - https://ombreolivier.substack.com/p/venezuela-and-west-taiwan
(that piece also republished an article written by a friend of mine back in 2022 looking at the disaster an invasion of Taiwan would be, particularly if the US decided to defend Taiwan)
A blockade just means we shut our markets, block Malacca, and play chicken. Oh, and break their blockade.
So they get the same war without the payoff.
I say this not to argue with you, but to agree that none of this is a walk in the park, and Trump is trying to escalate the risk such that Beijing thinks better of the whole thing.
It’s been more than 80 years since a large scale opposed landing has happened. No one knows how precision weapons affect it. No one has the tested doctrine to attack or defend. It’s not just himars. It’s javelin and TOW. Hitting landing craft at 2-3 km. No one knows what happens.
One minor technical point: ATACMS range is 300 km, not 165 km. The earliest versions, produced in the 1990s (Block I), had the range of 165 km, but that's old news by now. Block I missiles are also at the end of their shelf life at this point in time. Current ATACMS versions are 300 km.
***
On a different note, the idea that China is planning to invade in 2027 is, in my opinion, a psyop. First, I don't believe that something like this would be leaked by China inadvertently - any such "leak" is a deliberate disinformation. If China says 2027, then the real date (to the extent there is a specific real date) is something other than 2027. Since it presumably isn't 2026, it must be after 2027, when everyone breathes a sigh of relief on December 31, 2027, and says "Okey dokey then, we're safe, no invasion."
In my dilettante's view, China is not capable of a SUCCESSFUL seaborne invasion. First, there are only two successful examples of major seaborne invasions in the entire human history: D-day in 1944, and Okinawa in 1945. Both were across essentially uncontested waters, by armies that had years of combat experience, onto landing grounds conducive to such things. China's military has zero combat experience, the Taiwan Strait will be very much contested, and Taiwan's coast has virtually no beaches where an invading force can land.
Could Xi Jinping order it anyway? Anything is possible, but (again, in my dilettante's view) it is doomed to failure AND to a huge loss of face. The risk of the latter is another constraining factor.
One cautionary note: We think of the future invasion of Taiwan as a sort of "D-Day with Chinese characteristics", just using technology of the 2020s. But China's plan will no doubt rely to a much greater extent on pre-positioned special forces teams already on the island striking key targets and causing general chaos, as well as the local Fifth Column (the KMT) loudly calling for immediate capitulation.
Food for thought.
Good catch on ATACMS.
I also agree with your assessment of Chinese capabilities. We have a lot of smart people on our side who take "being ready by 2027" as "going to invade in 2027", but I think that's a mistake, not least in that I don't think they'll actually be ready.
The dangers are:
1. Xi Jinping has purged all the guys who had real combat experience and left only yesmen. So if he gets up on the wrong side of the bed one morning, we could have a problem.
2. The Chinese demographic collapse is accelerating. They really need to grab whatever they're going to in the next decade or there may never be another chance. They're not unaware, and this was part of Putin's logic in Ukraine too.
That said, I think Trump's strategy is calculated to address all of that. "Make the steal more expensive than it's worth." If war is likely to end badly, trade looks like a better option. It may not be -- ask Gorbachev -- but that's more an internal matter than an external one.
"First, there are only two successful examples of major seaborne invasions in the entire human history: D-day in 1944, and Okinawa in 1945."
Hmm...Hastings, 1066.
:) MAJOR seaborne invasions. :) MAJOR! :)
William the Conqueror had a total of something like 10,000 men. (Estimates vary.) It was certainly respectable for that time, but I am talking about MAJOR invasions.
Also, recall that the landing itself was unopposed - William didn't have to fight for the beach where he landed.
The Allied landing in Italy in 1943, and perhaps MarArthur's landing at Inchon, could conceivably qualify as the only other examples that I am aware of, with some qualifiers. These, incidentally, also illustrate the points I made earlier: they are operations by armies with years of combat experience, using uncontested waters, in places where the terrain was conducive to such things.
They better not count on Trump for help he has his own problems with Iran.
You're really not paying attention if you think that would hinder us at all.
I am more and more convinced that the Chicoms will go for a blockade rather than out right invasion.
That has always been in fact the logical choice because even without these latest weapons invading Taiwan is not a walk in the park and occupying, assuming any resistance is even worse. The mountainous east is tailor made for guerilla warfare and artillery, drones and missiles launched from that area can hit just about anywhere.
The new weapons do of course make invasion less likely especially because the PLA has seen how well they work against PLA radars etc. in Venezuela and Iran. There have been a number of arrests, changes of personnel and disappearances in the PLA and defense industries that seem to linked to the poor performance of Chinese hardware in both events this year. Something I discussed back in January when we had only seen the Maduro action - https://ombreolivier.substack.com/p/venezuela-and-west-taiwan
(that piece also republished an article written by a friend of mine back in 2022 looking at the disaster an invasion of Taiwan would be, particularly if the US decided to defend Taiwan)
A blockade just means we shut our markets, block Malacca, and play chicken. Oh, and break their blockade.
So they get the same war without the payoff.
I say this not to argue with you, but to agree that none of this is a walk in the park, and Trump is trying to escalate the risk such that Beijing thinks better of the whole thing.
It’s been more than 80 years since a large scale opposed landing has happened. No one knows how precision weapons affect it. No one has the tested doctrine to attack or defend. It’s not just himars. It’s javelin and TOW. Hitting landing craft at 2-3 km. No one knows what happens.
Quite so.
China isn't planning a D-Day invasion of Taiwan; they’re executing a slow, systematic strangulation. While the U.S. waits for domestic chip fabs to come online in 2030, Beijing is tightening the noose today using the Russian playbook. Here is why a sliver of silicon is the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoint on earth.https://triggledger.substack.com/p/the-silicon-choke-point-why-the-next?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=8gc1qf